This study analyzes a continuous-time N -agent Brownian moral hazard model with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and variance of the outcome process. In order to give a theoretical justification for the use of linear contracts, as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), we consider a variant of its generalization given by Sung (1995) , into which collusion and renegotiation possibilities among agents are incorporated. In this model, we prove that there exists a linear and stationary optimal compensation scheme which is also immune to collusion and renegotiation.
in our main result and the very same control laws, also solve agents' bargaining problem with their "real" date and state specific bargaining weights starting every date and state. Therefore, the fact that these particular bargaining weights are not necessarily agents' real bargaining weights (that the principal is not necessarily aware of) turns out not to be important. Due to the fact that, now, the principal is contracting with a representative agent having CARA preferences, her problem can be analyzed using techniques in Sung (1995) which enable us to establish that there is an optimal and stationary linear contract for the team. As linearity is preserved during the corresponding efficient redistribution of team's compensation to agents, our main result is established.
3 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , the pioneer work displaying the optimality of linear contracts in a repeated agency setting with exponential utilities, considers a principal-agent pair where the agent determines the drift rate of a Brownian motion.
4 Schättler and Sung (1993) extends this setting by considering a larger class of stochastic processes. The key restriction in both models is that the agent is not allowed to control the variance of the outcome process. Sung (1995) extends Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) 's Brownian model to the case where the agent can also control the diffusion rate of the Brownian motion. The resulting problem becomes similar to that in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) with an additional time-state independent constraint for which the linearity in outcome result holds. Koo, Shim, and Sung (2008) , on the other hand, presents a continuous-time agency model under moral hazard with many agents. 5 They show that optimal contracts are also linear in all outcomes produced separately by each agent. For their linearity result, the formulation involving the simultaneous-move game played by agents is important to preserve stationary decision making environment. Meanwhile, our model does not feature separate production processes and our agents can perfectly observe each other and can engage in renegotiable side-contracting.
The paper is organized as follows. While section 2 contains the model and the principal's problem, section 3 presents the main result and its proof and section 4 concludes. 3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that our analysis can be associated with bonus pools in investment banks. Bonus pools are allocated to divisions based on their performances. A division manager, who is given much flexibility, allocates the bonus to the employees. While some criticize nonuniform bonus allocations among employees on basis of fairness, our paper provides a justification: the bonus of an employee is determined through a utilitarian bargaining within the division, hence, depends on his relative bargaining power and risk preferences. The assumptions needed in this setting are: the employees cannot communicate with the shareholders; and the division manager knows the bargaining weights and risk aversion parameters of the employees, but the shareholders do not.
4 Lack of income effects with exponential utilities and time-state independent cost functions, imply that the optimal control the agent chooses is time-state independent. Stationarity of the environment implies that among all possible compensation schemes, an optimal one is stationary and linear in the final output.
5 Their model is a continuous-time counterpart of Holmstrom (1982) and an extension of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) with N agents. The principal has N production tasks one for each agent who cannot observe each other.
Model and Preliminaries
The principal and N agents interact over time interval t ∈ [0, 1]. At an instant t, agent i ∈ N ≡ {1, . . . , N } chooses an effort level e i t ∈ E i , E i a compact interval, and these choices are observable and verifiable by all the other agents, but not the principal. The probability space is given by (Ω, F, P ) where Ω is the space C = C([0, 1]) of all continuous functions on the interval [0, 1] with values in . So a particular event w ∈ Ω is of the form w : [0, 1] → . The effort choices e : [0, 1] → × i∈N E i , where e t = (e i t ) i∈N , imply control laws µ and σ which are assumed to be F tpredictable mappings, µ : [0, 1] × Ω → U and σ : [0, 1] × Ω → S, where U is a bounded open subset of and S is a compact subset of ++ . Controls µ and σ determine the instantaneous drift, µ t , and the diffusion rates, σ t , of a stochastic process, {X t } t , governed by a Brownian motion defined by dX t = µ t dt + σ t dB t . Indeed, µ t ≡ µ(t, X) and σ t ≡ σ(t, X).
6
The intermediate outcome X t should be thought of as the total returns up to period t ∈ [0, 1], and B t is the standard Wiener process. The drift and diffusion rates and intermediate accumulated returns are neither observable nor verifiable by the principal. However, X 1 , the level of accumulated returns at the end of the project, is observable and verifiable by the principal. At the beginning of the project, the principal and the agents agree upon a contract, i.e. salary rules S = (S i ) i∈N with S i : Ω → for all i ∈ N and control laws (µ, σ) with the restriction that salaries are payable at the end of the project according to the rules agreed upon at time 0 which depend only on X 1 .
7
Instantaneous time-state independent cost functions are given by c i (µ t , σ t ) where c i : U ×S → is twice continuously differentiable, i ∈ N . c i and c iµ (derivative with respect to mean) are bounded, and both c iµ and c iµµ (second derivative with respect to mean) are strictly positive. The total costs incurred by agent i ∈ N is given by 1 0 c i (µ t , σ t )dt. In this setting there is an interaction effect on the two moments of the outcome process and on the costs of agents. Yet, it also handles the standard environment with two agents in which one agent determines only the mean and the other agent only the variance, and the interaction effect on the costs is assumed to be minimal. 6 We assume σ satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition: There exists a constant K such that for Z,Z ∈ C[0, 1], |σ(t, Z) − σ(t,Z)| ≤ K sup 0≤s≤t |Z(s) −Z(s)|. Even though this condition may be weakened (as was suggested by an anonymous referee) by noticing that our process is one dimensional and by employing Revuz and Yor (1999, Theorem 3.5, p.390; Exercises 3.13-14, p.397 ) (while it would still hold for the optimal contract), we use this Lipschitz condition (so, Revuz and Yor (1999, Theorem 2.1, p.375) ) in order to have a parallel presentation with Sung (1995) .
7 This formulation is consistent with our hypothesis of the mean and variance being unobservable and nonverifiable by the principal. If (S i ) i∈N were to depend on the entire process {X t } t , implying that {X t } t is observable and verifiable by the principal, then she could infer {µ t } t and/or {σ t } t . For more, see footnotes 7 and 8 of Sung (1995) .
All have CARA utilities where the coefficients of the principal and agent i ∈ N are given by R and r i , respectively. The reservation certainty equivalent agent i ∈ N is given by W i0 . We assume
c i (µ s , σ s )ds is his net payoff at the end of the project.
At any t, h
t is observable and verifiable by all the agents but not the principal, and (S i ) i∈N is determined by the principal at the beginning of the project. Any communication between the principal and the agents is not allowed as in Che and Yoo (2001) . 8 Thus, at any instant a utilitarian bargaining problem among the agents emerges due to collusion opportunities. Its outcome can be implemented via state-contingent binding contracts drafted and agreed upon in date 0, specifying an allocation among the agents for each possible date and state. As for any given history agents' arrangement ensures optimality from that state onwards, our formulation involves renegotiation.
Collusion implies that the outcome of agents' bargaining is ex-ante efficient; so there is no history, state, and any other feasible contract that every agent (strictly) prefers to the one that was agreed upon. This brings about optimal risk sharing. Given F t -predictable salaries
: Ω → , denoting the salary arrangement (on compensations to be made at the end of the project) to i under S at t. Below we define the agents' problem where the first requirement is a natural feasibility constraint, the second a balanced budget condition, and the third agent i's date-t participation constraint. 
solves the agents' problem at θ if for a.e. t and h
8 Otherwise by offering additional payoffs the principal can make the agents report others' choices and implement the first-best, at least in a one-shot setting. While the value of this communication is not trivial due to agents' abilities to punish "snitches" in a repeated setting, not allowing any communication between the principal and the agents helps us to abstract from these complications. For more see footnote 13 of Barlo andÖzdogan (2013) . Moreover, footnote 2 of the current paper provides examples when this abstraction is plausible.
9 The date-t participation constraint considers the grand coalition/team, and not sub-coalitions. This can be justified when one assumes that each player has a right to veto the outcome of the agents' bargaining.
is maximized where WŜ
The principal is aware of the collusion capabilities and bargaining among agents. Hence, she knows that while she is restricted to offer contracts that solve the agents' problem starting any date and state for some bargaining weights, she is not aware of agents' "real" bargaining weights.
Definition 2 (The Principal's Problem) Principal chooses salary functionsŜ i : Ω → for i ∈ N and control lawsμ :
ii. Individual Rationality:
iii. The Agents' Problem: (S i ) i∈N and (µ, σ) must be such that there exists a profile of control laws
the agents' problem at some bargaining weights θ :
In Definition 2, feasibility and individual rationality are standard. Collusion, on the other hand, is handled by requiring that the principal's offer solves the agents' problem.
Optimality of Linearity
Our main theorem proves that the linearity results of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987 ), Schättler and Sung (1993 ), and Sung (1995 are robust with respect to collusion and renegotiation.
Theorem 1 There exists a stationary and linear optimal collusion proof and renegotiation proof contract.
The rest of the paper concerns the proof of this result which involves 3 steps. First, we analyze the efficiency implications of the agents' problem and obtain some desirable properties. In fact,
we show that the interaction among agents is similar to that in Bone (1998) and its aggregation result holds in our setting. This enables us to associate the agents' problem with one that involves a "representative agent" (the team of all agents) having a CARA utility. 10 11 In the second step we consider the associated version of the principal's problem with a team and establish optimality of linearity as in Sung (1995) . The final step shows that this result is preserved in the principal's problem containing the agents' when the team's payments are distributed efficiently.
Definition 3 Given t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] , (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t if there exists
Lemma 1 Given t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] , (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t if and only if there is (θ it ) i∈N ∈ int(∆) such that for a.e. X ∈ Ω and for any i, j ∈ N θ it r i exp −r i W
Proof. Let t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] be given. We denote the resulting probability density function on X by f (·; µ, σ | F t ). 12 Due to the strict concavity of the utility functions, the necessary conditions of the first-order analysis are also sufficient. Hence, (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t if
10 In that study a group of agents with CARA utilities jointly choose between uncertain prospects. A static environment is modeled, while the following two key aspects are common with our setting: (1) the choice of any prospect must be unanimously agreed, and (2) the uncertain outcomes from the chosen prospect are distributed among agents according to some unanimously made prior agreements.
11 An earlier study, Brennan and Kraus (1978) , shows that an aggregation leading to a representative agent representation is possible when agents have either CARA utilities or HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) preferences with equal exponents. And, it is shown in section 4 in Bone (1998) that this conclusion does not hold with nonidentical exponents. Moreover, the representative agent's utility function is not necessarily negative exponential with HARA utilities having identical exponents. However, as the stationary decision making environment is a key feature in the search for optimality of linearity, the CARA utilities' property of not involving any income effects and the use of stochastic processes with the martingale property are essential: The history in our setting determines the accumulated returns which do not influence agents' decisions due to lack of income effects; and, incremental future returns is expected not to be different from today's due to the martingale property.
12 It is useful to remind the reader that for any standard Brownian motion X = {X t : t ∈ [0, ∞)}, X t has a probability density function f t given by f t (x) = 1/( √ 2πt) exp{−x 2 /(2t)}.
and only if for every
where λ X denotes the Lagrangian multiplier of the feasibility for the redistribution in state X and it has to be strictly positive as the constraint binds due to the objective function being strictly increasing. Note that f (X; µ, σ | F t ) > 0, X ∈ Ω, and 6 is analogous to condition 4 of Bone (1998) .
Since the right-hand side of 6 does not depend on the identity of the agent, the result follows.
By following the same arithmetic manipulations of Bone (1998) (conditions 9-13), we obtain:
Lemma 2 Given t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] , (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t if and only if there is (θ it ) i∈N ∈ int(∆) such that for all i ∈ N and a.e. X ∈ Ω,
where r c = j 1/r j −1
Proof. The rearrangement of equation 5 in logarithmic form is as follows: for a.e X ∈ Ω and every i, j ∈ N , there exist {θ it , θ jt } at time t such that,
Summing across j while keeping i fixed results in
where r c and k it are as defined in the statement of the lemma. Hence, the result follows.
So given the history and control laws, static efficiency at that history implies that agent i's payment in instant t from the total payments (the team's state-contingent compensation) involves a (state-independent) constant payment, and a fraction which depends on agents' CARA coefficients and not the bargaining weights. Moreover, summing across agents these fractions add up to unity while the fixed payments sum to zero. This leads to the following:
Lemma 3 Suppose that for given t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] , (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t and let θ t ∈ int(∆), identifying (k it ) i ∈ N according to Lemma 2, be associated with (S i (t)) i . Let
for a.e. X ∈ Ω, is also static efficient at h t .
Proof. Let t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] be given, and (S i (t)) i∈N along with θ t and (k it ) i be as in the statement of the lemma. Hence, due to Lemmas 1 and 2 the profile (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t is equivalent to for a.e. X ∈ Ω θ it r i exp −r i k it + r c r iW S(t) (X; µ, σ) = θ jt r j exp −r j k jt + r c r jW S(t) (X; µ, σ) , which simplifies to, θ it r i exp {−r i k it } = θ jt r j exp {−r j k jt }. To see that (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t we prove that this profile satisfies 5. This follows from the last equation and for a.e. X ∈ Ω we haveWS (t) (X; µ, σ) =W Q(t) (X; µ, σ) and
.
We employ this lemma to establish that the principal does need not to know what the "real" bargaining weights θ t are. As the bargaining weights do not affect agents' shares from the total compensation when dealing with static efficiency at a given history, it can be shown that in such situations the interests of all the agents are perfectly aligned.
Lemma 4 Suppose that for given t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] , (S i (t)) i∈N associated with θ t and (k it ) i
and (S i (t)) i∈N are both static efficient at h t with the additional requirement that (S i (t)) i∈N is defined
Then,
if and only if
Proof. Let t and h t and (µ τ , σ τ ) τ ∈[0,1] be given and (S i (t)) i∈N associated with θ t and (k it ) i and (S i (t)) i∈N be as in the statement of the lemma. Notice that in light of Lemma 2 (equation 7), inequality 8 holds for any one of j ∈ N if and only if
delivering the desired conclusion as the last inequality is equivalent to 9. Now, we proceed with associating these conclusions with dynamic notions of efficiency:
a.e. t and h t it must be that (S i (t)) i∈N is static efficient at h t . We say that ((S i ) i , µ, σ) is efficient whenever (S i ) i is efficient for given µ and σ.
Then, under the light of our findings about efficiency and the fact that agents' interest are perfectly aligned, we wish to define the team's problem: 
where WŜ
The date-t participation constraint, 13, can be interpreted as follows: the expected utility of the representative agent (the team) cannot be strictly lower than the expected utility of any one of the agents. Otherwise whether or not such an agent would be willing to participate into the team arrangement is at jeopardy.
For any control laws (S T , µ T , σ T ) that solve the team's problem, we prove that we can construct a redistribution so that efficiency in every date and state is obtained and agents' problem is solved.
Lemma 5 for all t and h t is efficient and solves the agents' problem at θ * for given ((S i ) i , µ, σ).
In the next step we prove that for any ((S 
is static efficient at h t . So Lemma 2 applies and using θ * we obtain: 
The preceding two paragraphs establish that (1) the solution to the team's problem satisfies the constraints of the agents' problem when the distribution is done according to θ * , and (2) the solution of the agents' problem at θ * satisfies the constraints of the team's problem.
Finally, we establish that if (S
the agents' problem at θ * . From the above we know that ((S
is efficient. So using 14 and θ * , the objective function of the agents' problem (condition 1) becomes
Therefore, the objective functions of the two problems coincide, delivering the desired conclusion. Now, the principal may contract directly with the representative agent having a CARA coefficient
and a reservation certainty equivalent W c0 = i W i0 and costs c c :
Definition 6 Principal chooses a salary for the teamŜ c : Ω → and control lawsμ :
iii. S c and (µ, σ) must be such that there exists S c : [0, 1] × Ω → satisfying S c (1)(X) = S c (X), X ∈ Ω, so that for a.e. t and h t , (S c , µ, σ) maximizes
The principal's problem involving the representative agent given in Definition 6 belongs to the class studied in Sung (1995) and his Proposition 2 applies which we restate using our notation. Then (m * , s * ) is the optimal control pair for all t ∈ [0, 1], and the principal's optimal remaining expected utility V over time is given by V (t, X t ) = − exp {−R (X t − W c0 + (1 − t)Φ p (m * , s * ))}.
Furthermore, the optimal salary scheme S * c is linear in the final realized outcome X 1 , and is given by S * c (X 1 ) = W c0 + c c (m * , s * ) + c cµ (m * , s * ) ((X 1 − X 0 ) − m * ) + r c 2 (c cµ (m * , s * )) 2 s * 2 .
Proof. See the Appendix of Sung (1995) .
We have to emphasize that "Φ p is representative of the principal's expected utility" while "Φ a can be viewed as a representative of the (representative) agent's expected utility" (Sung 1995) .
Therefore, Lemma 6 tells that the principal's problem given in Definition 6 has a (stationary) 
